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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property policy requires balance between the goal of
motivating innovation and the need to prevent that motivation from
stifling further innovation. The constitutional grant of congressional
power to motivate innovation by securing “for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” is qualified by the requirement that congressional
enactments under the Intellectual Property Clause “promote progress.”
The speed of technological change, particularly in the converging
fields of computer software, music, video, television, and
communications, coupled with the power of technology industry
lobbying, have left the statutory balance tilted in favor of rewarding
innovators at the expense of further innovation and of consumers. A
particularly vulnerable class of consumers consists of “early adopters,”
consumers who buy early stage technology before an industry standard
is established. These consumers invest not only in the machinery of the
early stage technology but also in the acquisition of libraries of data
(including audio and video libraries) which are specific to the
technology platform. These early adopters contribute significantly to
the ultimate success or failure of new technologies and do so at the risk
of losing their investment, and needing to reacquire their libraries, if a
different technology prevails as the industry standard and renders their
early choice obsolete.
The Supreme Court has already recognized a time-shifting exception
to the intellectual property rights of innovators and lower courts have
recognized a place-shifting exception. It is now the time and place for a
general technology-shifting exception which would allow consumers to
shift their media libraries from one format to another without violating
intellectual property law.
This Article begins with a brief history of the Intellectual Property
Clause, congressional implementation of the clause, and judicial
responses. It then summarizes the role of early adopters in “promoting
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progress” and argues that while Congress has broad discretion in
balancing “promoting progress” with securing authors and inventors
“exclusive rights,” protection of the early adopters’ role is
constitutionally required. Next, it illustrates how securing a right of
technology-shifting (transferring patented or copyrighted works from an
older, obsolete, technology to a new technology) satisfies the
requirement of promoting progress and fits within the historical model.
Finally, it proposes both statutory and judicial steps toward protection
of this right.
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property laws require a balance between the need to
motivate innovation and the need to prevent that motivation from
1
stifling further innovation. The foundation of copyright and patent law
is Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the
power to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
2
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” but that
power is subject to the duty “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
3
useful Arts.”
That congressional power is implemented through federal patent (35

1. Trademark law finds its foundation in a different source, the Commerce Clause. See
discussion infra Part II.C.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is variously referred to in the literature as
the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause. For a detailed
history of how the clause was drafted and adopted, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994). Some of the
terms used in the clause arguably had different meanings in the eighteenth century than they
do today. “Author” had a broader meaning which included “he to whom anything owes its
origin; . . . one who completes a work of science or literature.” Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (quoting Worcester). This would have been the
meaning of “Author of liberty” as used in the fourth verse of America. REV. SAMUEL
FRANCIS
SMITH,
America
(1831),
available
at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.200000012/default.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2010). The original manuscript is online at the Library of Congress website, available at
http://cweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.1000010476/default.html.
The term “useful
arts” was used to distinguish from “liberal arts” and referred to what would today be called
“technology.” Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the
contemporary meaning of “inventor,” see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through
Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 445 (2007).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is convenient to refer to the “promote the [p]rogress”
phrase as the preamble and the balance of the clause as the body of the Intellectual Property
Clause.
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U.S.C.) and copyright (17 U.S.C.) statutes, each of which provide
general protection for innovators coupled (consistent with the
constitutional duty) with exceptions designed to minimize certain
aspects of the innovation-stifling effects of monopolies. While patents
and copyrights are authorized by the same clause of the Constitution,
their implementing statutes differ and congressional attitudes toward
the two regimes have been radically different. While patent rights have
been under attack and restricted, Congress has expanded copyright
owners’ rights, to the point where several Supreme Court Justices have
questioned whether the rights exceed constitutional authority.
Overly broad intellectual property rights injure competitors and
consumers. A particularly vulnerable class of consumers consists of
“early adopters,” consumers who adopt early stage technology before
an industry standard is established (for example, buyers of Radio
Shack’s Tandy computer, Sony’s Betamax videorecorder or Toshiba’s
HDD high-definition DVD players). These consumers invest not only
in the machinery necessary to use the early stage technology but also in
the time and effort to learn how to make use of the technology before it
has been fully tested by large groups of users, and in the development of
libraries of data that can only be accessed using the new machinery.
These early adopters contribute significantly to the ultimate success or
failure of new technologies and do so at the risk of losing their
investment if a different technology prevails as the industry standard,
rendering their choice obsolete.
Congress has the initial responsibility for striking the appropriate
balance between motivation of innovators on the one hand, and
prevention of innovation-stifling overprotection (and consequently
protection of the general public) on the other. There are examples of
congressional balancing in both the copyright and patent statutes. The
copyright statute contains a fair use exception, which permits the use of
copyrighted works for purposes such as criticism, and also contains an
exclusion of protection for ideas, which permits experimentation with
alternative expressions of underlying concepts. The patent statute
contains an exception for medical research and also contains a general
exclusion of protection for laws of nature, which prevents
monopolization of fundamental discoveries that might otherwise
prevent development of entire fields.
The speed of technological change, particularly in the converging
fields of computer software, music, video, television, and
communications, coupled with the power of technology industry lobbies,
has left the statutory balance tilted in favor of rewarding innovators at
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the expense of further innovation and of consumers.
Courts have held that additional protections are required by the
constitutional duty to promote progress: the Supreme Court recognized
a time-shifting exception to the rights of innovators in Sony Corp. v.
4
Universal City Studios, Inc., and lower courts have recognized a place5
shifting exception. It is now the time and place for a technologyshifting exception.
Ideally, Congress should amend the copyright and patent statutes to
provide this exception. The “exclusive” rights that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to grant are exclusive in the sense of “rights to
exclude” rather than “all-inclusive rights.” Thus, there is room to
reward innovators with exclusive rights while still reserving sufficient
rights to guard against stifling further innovation. Until Congress takes
such action, the courts should recognize that all statutory patent and
copyright rights are subject to a constitutionally required right of
technology-shifting.
I. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHALLENGE: MOTIVATING
INNOVATION WITHOUT IMPEDING PROGRESS
Patents and copyrights existed in eighteenth-century England and
the colonies, although they differed from modern patents and
6
copyrights. The Articles of Confederation reserved the power to grant
7
copyrights and patents to the states rather than create a federal system.
8
9
10
11
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia all had copyright
statutes, although those statutes secured authors’ rights prior to
publication, rather than the modern statute’s right to prevent others

4. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
5. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
1999); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003).
6. All of the colonial statutes were directed toward protecting what would now be
classed as “literary” works. Works of visual art were not covered and, of course, the concept
of recorded sound was unknown at the time (and protection of sound recordings did not enter
the copyright statute until the late twentieth century. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(7) (2006). Act
of Oct. 15, 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88
Stat. 1873 (1974) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006)).
7. Article II of the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states all
rights not expressly granted to the United States. No right to grant patents or copyrights was
included in Articles II and IX of the Articles of Confederation.
8. Act of May 27, 1783, for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature.
9. Act of April 29, 1786, to Promote Literature.
10. Act of December, 1783, for the Benefit of Publishing.
11. Act of October 1785, for Authors of Literary Works.
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13

from using the published work. Georgia and New Hampshire
recognized both copyrights and patents. Most colonial patents were
granted by special acts of the legislature, but at least one state, South
14
Carolina, had a general patent statute.
Other state constitutions
15
explicitly prohibited the grant of monopolies and in any event, colonial
16
patents appear to have been rarely granted and rarely enforced.
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, James Madison could
observe in hindsight that “[t]he States cannot separately make effectual
17
provision for either [patents or copyrights]” and the Convention
incorporated Article I, Section 8, Clause 2, the basis of modern patent
18
and copyright law, into the Constitution. The Intellectual Property
Clause empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
19
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The
records of the Constitutional Convention shed little light on the reason
for including the Intellectual Property Clause. The clause was adopted
without debate by the full Convention and with little record of
20
committee deliberations. The patent language in particular appears to
12. Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius.
13. Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius.
14. “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of making or
vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same privileges and
restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.” An Act for the
Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. Laws 333–34. Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973) (describing five patents issued by the Colonies).
15. Two states that explicitly prohibited monopolies are Maryland and North Carolina.
MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XLI, § 39 (1867) (“[M]onopolies are odious,
contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to
be suffered.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII (1868)
(“[P]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be
allowed.”).
16. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16 (“One indication of the relatively low value
attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation involving
colonial patents . . . .”).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 287 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press, 1945).
18. Trademark law’s foundation is the Commerce Clause rather than the Intellectual
Property Clause. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141 (2006). There are substantive reasons to treat trademarks differently from patents and
copyrights, discussed infra Part II.C.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is variously referred to in the literature as
the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause.
20. “No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record concerning the
interpretation or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause by the delegates
themselves.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995).
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have been added in committee with no record of who made the addition
21
or why. The first mention of a section directed to intellectual property
appears in the records of August 18, 1787, when it was proposed to
grant the federal government the power “[t]o secure to literary authors
their copy rights for a limited time . . . [;] [t]o encourage, by proper
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries . . . [;] [t]o grant patents for useful inventions[;] [and t]o
22
secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.” It appears that
at least four alternatives were discussed: (1) “To secure to literary
23
authors their copy rights for a limited time”; (2) “To encourage by
premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge
and
24
25
discoveries”; (3) “To grant patents for useful inventions”; and (4) “To
26
secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.”
27
The proposal was referred to the Committee of Detail where it
appears to have remained without further attention until August 31,
1787, when it was referred to the Grand Committee of Eleven along
28
with a number of other unresolved proposals. On September 5, 1787,
the Committee of Eleven presented the Intellectual Property Clause to
29
the Convention in its final form; on September 12, the Committee of
21. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 51 (“There is no record to indicate how the
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed into
this clause. Madison, as a member of the responsible committee, must have known but never
explained it. Nor did any other member of the Committee.”). Walterscheid notes that there
are inconsistent records of who proposed the clause, even within Madison’s notes. Id. at 50–
51.
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321–22 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937); see also Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever on the Installment Plan? An
Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119, 1140 (2002).
23. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
477 (Ohio University Press 1984) (Madison’s suggestion on August 18, 1787).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 478 (Pinckney’s suggestion).
26. Id. Pinckney also suggested, “[t]o establish seminaries for the promotion of
literature and the arts & sciences” and “[t]o establish public institutions, rewards and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.” Id.
27. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 192–
93 n.7 (1967).
28. MADISON, supra note 23, at 569. The Grand Committee of Eleven comprised one
member from each state except Rhode Island and New York, which did not have delegates
present at the time. Id.
29. Galbraith, supra note 22, at 1140. (“On September 5, 1787 . . . the Committee of
Eleven reported back with the following language: ‘To promote the progress of Science and
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors the exclusive right to their
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Stile and Arrangement presented the Constitution to the full
Convention, with the Intellectual Property Clause unchanged, and on
September 17, the clause was approved unanimously and without
debate or any other record of why the interim language changes were
30
made.
Although there is little evidence on which to base a proof, logical
arguments have been suggested for why such a clause might have been
included in an eighteenth-century political document. The three most
compelling arguments are that the clause was designed to provide an
incentive to innovate, that the clause did no more than acknowledge
what would have been viewed at the time as the natural property of
31
authors and inventors, and that the clause was meant to limit the ways
32
in which the federal government could reward inventors and authors.
An essay written during the ratification debates supports the first
argument: that the justification for the clause was to reward inventors
and authors. The essay further observes that the Intellectual Property
Clause rewards inventors and authors without committing government
33
resources, which the new federal government simply did not have.
Supporting the “natural property” argument are contemporary
statements such as those by the literary property committee of the
Constitutional Convention, which was “persuaded that nothing is more
34
35
properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study,” of James Madison,
respective writings and discoveries.’”).
30. Id. at 1140–41.
On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full
Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the Copyright Clause with the
language unchanged from the September 5 version. On September 17, the
Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded
debate of the Copyright Clause.
Id. See also Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26.
31. See discussion supra Part I.
32. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (“The clause is both a grant of
power and a limitation.”).
33. Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 American Museum or
Repository of Ancient and Modern Fugitive Pieces 303 (1789) (“As to those monopolies,
which, by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to ingenious discoveries in
countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no resources to reward
extraordinary merit.”).
34. The committee language actually supports all three theories: that intellectual
property is “properly a man’s own,” that protecting it would “encourage genius,” and that it
would promote “extension of arts and commerce.”
The committee, consisting of Mr. [Hugh] Williamson, Mr. [Ralph] Izard and Mr.
[James] Madison, to whom were referred sundry papers and memorials from
different persons on the subject of literary property, being persuaded that nothing is
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36

and of John Witherspoon.
While consistent with natural rights
philosophy, these views find little historical support. A contemporary
scholar looking to English precedent would have been led to the 1602
37
38
case of Darcy v. Allein and the 1623 Statute of Monopolies. In Darcy,
the court invalidated a monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth I on
playing cards, holding monopolies generally illegal and detrimental
because they raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and
39
reduced competition. The court acknowledged that the monopoly at
issue was a “royal favor” monopoly and that an inventor who “by his
own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any
new trade into the realm whether by a truly new invention or by
bringing to England a new trade or industry known elsewhere—might

more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and
security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote
useful discoveries and to the general extension of arts and commerce, beg leave to
submit the following report: Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states,
to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being
citizens of the United States, and to their heir or assigns executors, administrators
and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than fourteen
years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall
survive the term first mentioned, and to their heirs or assigns executors,
administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another term of time not
less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and
vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, or publishers, or their
assigns their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under
restrictions as to the several states may seem proper.
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326–27 (Friday, May 2, 1783) (Gaillard
Hunt ed., Government Printing Office 1922) (strikethrough in original text), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjclink.html (last visited April 14, 2010). Note that
the proposal is much more specific than the clause that ultimately was adopted.
35. “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at
287 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press, 1945). Nimmer concludes, however, that
Madison’s reference to the control over unpublished works afforded eighteenth-century
British authors as “common law copyright” is “somewhat inaccurate[].” 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (2009).
36. Witherspoon believed that society owed inventors reasonable compensation for the
use of their inventions. John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 152, 228 (Thomas Miller ed., Southern Illinois University
Press 1990).
37. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260
(K.B. 1602).
38. Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
39. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.
Darcy v. Allein, (1378–1865) Noy, 173, 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (K.B. 1602).
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usefully receive a monopoly.” In 1623, Parliament enacted the Statute
of Monopolies, which codified the general prohibition of monopolies
but, like the court in Darcy, it recognized the distinction between royal
favors and inventions and provided that the general prohibition of
monopolies should
not extend to any letters patents [] and grants of privilege for the
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole
working or making of any manner of new manufactures within
this realm [] to the true and first inventor []and inventors of such
manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters
patents and grants shall not use[], so as also they be not contrary
41
to the law nor mischievous to the state . . . .
These sources do not justify patents or copyrights as natural rights
and in fact classify inventors together with importers of “a new trade or
industry known elsewhere that was never used before.” Rather, they
justify them on the basis of a closely related natural right that would
have been recognized in the eighteenth century—the right to maintain a
42
trade secret. As Thomas Jefferson observed, “[i]f nature has made any
one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is . . .
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the
43
possession of every one . . . .”

40. Id.
41. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
42. Trade secret protection arises under common law but has been codified by statute
(most of which are based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act) in a majority of states and the
District of Columbia. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985). The general requirements for
protection of a common law trade secret, or its codified version, are the possession of
confidential information, which confers an economic benefit on those with knowledge of such
information, plus reasonable steps to maintain its confidentiality. The common law, and its
codified version, prohibit misappropriation of such secrets. See id. § 1(4). Federal law
provides trade secret protection in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2006); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839.
43. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., The Viking Press 1975).
Jefferson further observed: “Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less,
because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me.” Id. “This observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for
the sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade secret law is that there is economic value in keeping
competitors in the dark.” Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of
Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 236 n.20 (1999).
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This natural right to one’s trade secrets suggests the third theory of
justification for an Intellectual Property Clause: motivating neither
invention nor authorship but rather disclosure. Inventors and authors
have two options for profiting from their work: keep the work
44
confidential, thus relying on trade secret protection, or commercialize
the work publicly. Public commercialization irrevocably surrenders the
trade secret. Without the protection of intellectual property law,
competitors who thus learn the secret can make use of it without having
spent the time and money to develop it. In economic terms, this gives
the competitor an advantage over the innovator since the competitor’s
pricing does not need to recover research and development costs.
Facing a competitor who can use the same innovation at lower cost
reduces the incentive to innovate. Thus, by providing the right to
exclude competitors from the use of the innovation for a limited term,
the Intellectual Property Clause may be viewed as an incentive to
45
encourage innovators to share their ideas.
It follows that the rights granted by intellectual property law must be
limited in duration—otherwise, the public receives no benefit from the
exchange while the innovator no longer risks the loss of trade secret
rights and in effect obtains a perpetual monopoly. This limitation is
46
47
expressed in the preamble to the Intellectual Property Clause and its
44. As long as the requirements for trade secrecy (valuable confidential information as
to which reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality) are met, a trade secret
may be maintained—in theory, indefinitely. A public disclosure of the trade secret would
destroy it. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
45. Some inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade
secrecy. For example, a machine that makes it cheaper to produce an end product may be
kept as a trade secret while the inventor profits by sale of the end product. Most states
recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the protection of trade
secret law. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Thus,
products that reveal the secret are difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy,
and for this reason works of authorship are often difficult to commercialize while maintaining
trade secrecy. However, computer software is a large commercially valuable class of works of
authorship that may be commercialized publicly, protected by copyright and maintained as a
trade secret by releasing executable code only, or by marketing services performed using the
software rather than the software itself. “Cloud computing” utilizes this business model.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Whether the preamble (in order “to promote the
Progress”) is a limitation on Congress’s power or merely precatory has been extensively
analyzed. The secondary literature debating whether the language limits Congress’s power or
merely explains why the Founders included a provision authorizing monopolies is analyzed
infra Part II.
47. “[T]he federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which
authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.’” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “The
clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5
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purpose is twofold:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit . . . . [They are] intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
48
exclusive control has expired.
For a clause with such enormous economic importance today, there
is little historical record of discussion of its terms during the
Constitutional Convention. A number of explanations have been
offered for this lack of debate: (1) support for patent rights and
49
copyrights was universal and there was nothing to debate; (2) patents
and copyrights were so unimportant that no one cared enough to debate
50
the proposal; and (3) the Convention had limited time and more
51
important issues to resolve.
Whatever the reason that the Convention directed little attention to
the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress made use of the power
52
53
quickly, passing the first patent statute and the first copyright statute

(1966).
48. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Sony involved
copyrights, but the Court’s analysis borrows heavily from patent law.
49. Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System . . . The Past Is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 437, 440 (1980) (“The delegates clearly believed firmly that it was
in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system.”). Unfortunately, this lack of
controversy and legislative history has provided later scholars with little guidance as to the
framers’ original intent.
50. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16 (“One indication of the relatively low value
attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation involving
colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English court.”).
51. Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System,
71 AM. SCI. 500 (1983).
The absence of debate over the patent provision . . . has been taken as proof of their
firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially beneficial innovation.
However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution proceeded without
paying much attention to the subject, since they were also faced with the larger
problems of how to structure the government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend
the new nation.
Id. at 500; Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26 (“It may well have been that the
delegates were tired [and] wanted to go home . . . .”).
52. Act of Apr. 10, 1790 (Patent Act of 1790), ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790) (repealed
1793).
53. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1802).
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in the second term of its first session. The first patent statute gave the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the
Attorney General (the “Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful
54
Arts”) the power to grant a patent for fourteen years to anyone who
“hath . . . invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, . . . or
55
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used . . . .”
56
The first copyright statute gave “authors of any map, chart, book or
books . . . being a [citizen or resident of the United States] . . . the sole
right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending [the
same] for the term of fourteen years from the recording of the title
57
thereof . . . .” Prints were added to the list of copyrightable categories
58
in 1802, and the statute was later amended to accommodate
59
technological advances.
II. FINDING BALANCE: THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF
LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION
The Constitution gave Congress both a power and a limitation with
regard to intellectual property: the power to provide innovators
exclusive rights for limited times, subject to the limitation that the
60
power be exercised so as to promote progress. Two main statutory
intellectual property regimes emerge in Titles 17 (copyrights) and 35
(patents) of the U.S. Code. Both enactments provide the incentive of
61
exclusivity for innovators coupled, consistent with the associated

54. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1966).
55. § 1, 1 Stat. at 110.
56. The term “copyright” was not used until 1831. (“An act . . . respecting copyright.”
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (1831)).
57. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
58. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (repealed).
59. Specific provisions were added to cover motion pictures (17 U.S.C. § 106(4)
(2006)); sound recordings (17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)); computer software (17 U.S.C. § 117); and
digital audio (17 U.S.C. § 106(6)).
60. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), the Court held that
“[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not
be ignored.” Id. at 6. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146–52 (1989); Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
Constitution limits the patent statute to the “purpose of advancing the useful arts—the
process today called technological innovation”).
61. The patent incentive is provided in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), which provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
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objective of promoting innovation, with exceptions designed to
62
minimize certain innovation-impeding effects. The Constitution does
not specify the specific term of exclusivity to be given as an incentive.
In fact, Congress has from time to time changed the term and provided
63
different terms for different types of intellectual property.
As with most provisions of the Constitution, the details were left to
Congress with only broad guidance. Working out the details requires
resolving the extremely thorny issue of how to promote progress. In the
recent patent case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, Inc. v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Justice Breyer noted the fundamental
problem:

therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” The copyright incentive is
provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), which provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
62. Major exceptions to the rights of patent owners include limiting patents to only
four categories of statutory subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), and excluding from patent
protection “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,” Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1981), because “[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), reflecting “a basic judgment that protection in such cases,
despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or
discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself,” Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Major exceptions to the rights of copyright owners include excluding underlying ideas from
protection and excluding specific uses (notably fair use) from infringement, both discussed
infra Part II.B.
63. Most recently, it changed the term of United States Patents from seventeen years
from date of issue to twenty years from date of application. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
Design patents last for fourteen years. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2006). Copyrights originally
lasted for fourteen years and were extendable for an additional fourteen years; under current
law they may last for up to ninety years beyond the life of the author. See discussion infra
Part II.B.
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sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. . . .
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by
64
impeding the free exchange of information . . . .
In addition, granting monopolies imposes a transaction cost—one
wishing to avoid infringement must investigate existing grants to
determine whether they might be infringed (which itself is costly) and
must take the risk of liability for an incorrect conclusion. The problem
65
of such transaction costs surfaced early. The 1793 patent statute
established a registration system, under which an applicant only needed
to allege having “invented any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, not known or used before the application” and “present a
66
petition to the Secretary of State,” at which point the Secretary was
authorized to issue a patent without any examination of the validity of
67
the applicant’s allegations. This system produced a large number of
patents that were “worthless and void, as conflicting with, and infringing
upon one another, or upon, public rights not subject to patent privilege;
arising either from a want of due attention to the specifications of claim,
or from the ignorance of the patentees of the state of the arts.” This
resulted in “a great number of lawsuits . . . which are daily increasing in
an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and
68
injurious to society.”
In response, Congress amended the patent
statute in 1836 and created a distinct Patent Office within the
Department of State to review applications to determine patentability
69
prior to issue. This initial review by the Patent Office reduces the
number of patents that are issued and presumably rejects a significant

64. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 126–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
65. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836).
66. Id. at 319–20.
67. Under the 1793 system, patents were issued “without any examination into the
merit or novelty of the invention.” SEN. JOHN RUGGLES, SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING
S. 239, 24th Cong. at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1836).
68. Id.
69. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20.
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number or applications that should not be issued, therefore reducing
transaction costs. Issued patents are published and available at the
Patent Office. A full text database is also available online, making it
70
possible to search for potential blocking patents. Although reduced,
transaction costs associated with reviewing a large number of copyrights
and patents to determine which of them must be avoided remain and
can be significant, especially since the number of issued patents has
71
risen dramatically. The same problem arises, of course, with respect to
72
copyrights, and is potentially even more difficult to manage since
copyrights need not be registered and it is therefore impossible to do a
comprehensive search for potential infringement. Furthermore, preregistration review by the Copyright Office is cursory—those copyrights
that are registered are checked only to determine whether they meet the
threshold standard for authorship (and whether the registration fee has
been paid), not for similarity to other works. “Our copyright system has
73
no . . . provision for previous examination . . . [of] originality . . . .”
A. The Federal Patent Statute: Rights and Exceptions
Unlike copyrights, patents have no common law basis and exist
74
purely as a federal legislative right.
The power granted by the
Intellectual Property Clause is exercised with respect to inventions in
75
Title 35 of the U.S. Code. Regulations governing the Patent Office
and processing of patent applications are contained in Title 37 of the
76
Code of Federal Regulations, and specific internal rules governing the

70. A blocking patent is a patent, which would be infringed by a product. The U.S.
Patent Office updates the database weekly and makes it available at http://patft.uspto.gov/.
71. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, fifty-five patents were
issued. In 2008, the most recent year for which statistics are available, 157,772 utility patents
were issued. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING
TEAM: TABLE OF ANNUAL U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY SINCE 1790 (2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.pdf.
72. It is impossible to determine the number of copyrights created in recent years since
registration is no longer required. The number of works registered, however, has grown from
5,600 in 1870 (the first year for which records exist) to 526,378 in 2007, the last year for which
statistics are available. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS:
FISCAL
YEAR
ENDING
SEPTEMBER
30,
2007
58
(2007),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/ar2007.pdf.
73. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
74. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006) (conferring
exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters).
75. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376 (2006).
76. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–501.11 (2009).
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examination of patent applications are contained in the Manual of
77
Patent Examining Procedure.
78
Three types of patents are authorized: utility patents, design
79
80
All three types of patents require
patents, and plant patents.
81
disclosure, and eventually publication, of the claimed invention. Only
utility patents pose the problem of technological obsolescence and are
therefore the only category discussed below.
The fundamental
exchange required by utility patent law is the inventor’s surrender of a
trade secret in exchange for the patent, promoting progress (as the
82
preamble of the Intellectual Property Clause requires) by putting the
public in possession of information that the inventor could have
83
withheld and giving the inventor the incentive of an assured term of
77. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (8th ed., rev. 7, July 2008) [hereinafter MPEP].
78. Utility patents may be granted for inventions falling within one of four classes
enumerated in the statute. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. §
101. Certain types of inventions that fall within one of these categories have been held not to
be patentable under judicially created exceptions. “[P]henomena of nature . . . are part of the
storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). “Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972).
79. Design patents may be granted for novel ornamental designs. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
80. Plant patents may be granted for distinct and new varieties of plants that have been
asexually reproduced. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006). Tuber propagated plants are excluded.
81. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122.
82. An issued patent is public and therefore information contained in the application
can no longer be maintained as a trade secret.
83. In addition, the patent system is designed to motivate placing technology in the
public domain promptly. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103 provide, in effect, a statute of
limitations for filing a patent application and more generally the patent statute denies patents
to applicants who have abandoned, suppressed or concealed their inventions. 35 U.S.C. §
102(c).
The courts have consistently held that an invention . . . is deemed abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after completion, no steps are
taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent
application; to describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use
the invention publicly, has been held to constitute abandonment, suppression or
concealment.
Int’l Glass Co., Inc. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citations omitted).
Commercial use of the claimed invention by the inventor for a significant period before filing
a patent application also can result in loss of patent rights. In Metallizing Engineering Co. v.
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., the court explained, “If an inventor should be permitted
to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should . . .
make and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits . . . it would materially
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exclusive control over the invention (as the body of the Intellectual
84
Property Clause requires).
1. Providing the Required Time-Limited Incentive
A patent gives its owner the right to stop competitors from making,
using, selling, or importing the patented invention for a period starting
85
on the date the patent is issued and ending twenty years after the date
86
the patent application was filed.
Violation of these rights by an
infringer gives rise to damages which are to be “no . . . less than a
87
Injunctions against infringement are also
reasonable royalty. . . .”
88
89
available, although not automatic and attorney fees may be awarded
90
in certain cases.
2. Furthering Progress
The patent statute promotes technological progress directly by the
incentive it offers for disclosure, but also indirectly by what it requires
retard the progress of science and the useful arts.” 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal
citation omitted). There is an exception for experimental use by the inventor prior to filing a
patent application if necessary in order to perfect the invention. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.,
97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
84. The patent owner’s control is exclusive (meaning the right to exclude) but not
exhaustive—the patent owner can only prevent others from making, using, selling, or
importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
86. The patent expires twenty years after the date the earliest application was filed
(i.e., if there are a series of related patent applications, referred to as “continuing
applications,” the term is measured from the date the first in the series was filed), and is
subject to adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in processing by the Patent
Office. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 284. Although the statute specifies that damages be “no less than a
reasonable royalty,” in practice damages rarely exceed what is determined to be a reasonable
royalty. Third Wave Techs., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1011 (W.D. Wis.
2005) (Under § 284, courts “imagine a negotiation between the patentee and infringer taking
place at the moment the infringement began . . . [which] is an approach that experts have
employed for decades in patent cases.”).
88. “[C]ourts . . . may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283.
89. Because a patent is, by definition, unique, it might appear that damages would
never be a completely adequate remedy for infringement—allowing an infringer to continue
infringing and pay damages arguably does not protect the patent owner’s “exclusive” rights.
However, in eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court held that even in patent cases, a
court must apply the traditional equitable four-factor test in deciding whether it is
appropriate to issue an injunction. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 285.

OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10

2010]

“TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS

5/26/2010 2:19 PM

287

of patent applicants and what it excludes from patentability.
The patent statute is designed to promote technological progress in
four major ways: (1) it provides an incentive for the creation of
something new (and conversely excludes protection for material which
91
92
is already available to the public or would likely become available);
(2) it denies patents to certain fundamental discoveries deemed
93
necessary for broad technological development; (3) it limits patents to
94
inventions that the public did not already have; and (4) it requires that
the innovator provide a description of how to make and use the
invention so that, once the patent expires, the public has possession of
95
the invention.
To accomplish these goals, the patent statute requires that in order
to receive a patent, an inventor must file an application with the U.S.
96
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
The application is
reviewed for compliance with the patent statute, which requires, among
97
other things, a determination that the claimed invention: (1) is a
91. 35 U.S.C. § 102 denies patentability to ideas which were public either before their
supposed invention by the patent applicant, § 102(a), or sufficiently long before the applicant
chose to apply for a patent, § 102(b). The two subclauses have different purposes. Section
102(a) reinforces the § 101 principle that only the inventor is entitled to a patent: if there
were a printed publication describing the invention before the applicant’s date of invention,
then that publication must have been written by someone else and the applicant cannot be
the inventor. On the other hand, § 102(b) applies even if the applicant is the one who wrote
the printed publication. The purpose of § 102(b) is to discourage inventors from delaying
filing an application (thereby delaying, if not destroying, the public benefit of the disclosure
of the invention) or from filing a patent application only after efforts to preserve a trade
secret have failed. In the case of copyrights, writings may only be protected to the extent that
they are original. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
92. “Inventions” must be truly inventive and not merely obvious improvements on
existing knowledge. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966);
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850).
93. “[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are also unpatentable.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
94. The claimed invention must be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and non-obvious, 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
95. “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).
97. One of the required elements of a patent application is at least one claim. The
claims must define “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35
U.S.C. § 112. Consistent with the balance between protection of inventions and allowing
public access to basic ideas, what is reviewed and may ultimately be protected by a patent is
the claimed invention, not the underlying or background concepts. MPEP, supra note 77, §
2106.
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98

99

machine, manufacture, composition of matter or process; (2) is useful;
100
(3) is novel; (4) would not be considered obvious by a hypothetical
101
person of ordinary skill in the field having complete knowledge of the
102
prior art; and (5) is fully described—that is, the application teaches
103
how to make and use the invention. Only claims that are determined
104
to satisfy the statutory requirements may be issued as a patent.
a. Disclosure
The patent statute furthers progress by requiring the public
disclosure of the invention. This accomplishes two things—it puts the
public in possession of new knowledge and it destroys any trade secret
rights. It does so through the mechanism of requiring the filing of a
written patent application that will be published no later than when the
105
106
patent is issued. The patent application must describe and illustrate
how to make and use the invention and also disclose what the applicant
98. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). These categories are collectively referred to as “statutory
subject matter” and are the only types of inventions, which may be patented. Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery,
however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of
patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”). Interpretation of the four categories is,
however, broad, with the term “composition of matter” including “anything under the sun
that is made by man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 318 (1980) (rejecting the
argument that a genetically engineered bacterium was implicitly excluded from statutory
subject matter because, although a “composition of matter,” it was alive).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit views this requirement as constitutionally
required so as to limit patentability to the “purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process
today called technological innovation.” Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
1985). The Patent Office interprets § 101 to require that the claimed invention has a
“specific, substantial, and credible [use].” MPEP, supra note 77, § 2107.
100. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102. Novelty generally means that the claimed invention was
not available to the public before the applicant invented it, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a); or one year
prior to the effective filing date of the applicant’s patent application, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
102. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
104. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 131, 151.
105. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a “trade secret” as:
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). Publication of a patent destroys the associated
trade secrets by two mechanisms: it makes them generally known, and it is a failure to make
reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy.
106. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 113.
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believes to be the best mode for carrying out the invention, referred to
107
as the “enablement” and “best mode” requirements, respectively. The
enablement requirement is designed to assure that the public gets access
to enough information to practice the invention once the term of the
108
patent expires. The best mode requirement is designed to prevent an
applicant from disclosing a theoretically feasible but impractical way of
109
implementing the invention while concealing a better way of doing so.
b. Reservations: Statutory Subject Matter, Novelty and
Obviousness/Exhaustion and Repair
The patent statute also helps promote progress by what it reserves to
future innovators and the public—limits on the types of advances that
may be protected and limits on a patent owner’s enforcement rights.
By statute, only certain categories of invention are patentable:
110
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.
“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and
nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of
111
patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”
By judicial
interpretation, certain types of inventions are not patentable even
though they fall within one of the four categories of statutory subject
matter.
“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they
112
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” The balance
between the constitutional goal of motivating disclosure and the risk of
stifling innovation is delicate. Innovation must be encouraged but basic
theoretical discoveries must remain available for use by other
innovators. “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of
it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created
113
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”
107. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention . . . and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.”).
108. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
109. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
111. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
112. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). See also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (Laws of nature “are part of the storehouse of
knowledge . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas [are
unpatentable].”).
113. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
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The novelty requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and the non115
obviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103 taken together prevent
granting patents in exchange for knowledge that was already available
to the public, or which would likely have become available to the public
without the applicant’s disclosure. This assures that the public does not
pay the price of granting a monopoly for something that it already has
or, in the ordinary course of events, would have. Patents are, as
required by the preamble of the Intellectual Property Clause, an
incentive to add to public knowledge and so should not be granted for
116
knowledge which is already available to the public. As explained by
117
the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
“[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in the
ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the
case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior
118
inventions of their value or utility.”
A patent owner—one who has satisfied all of the above
requirements—obtains an “exclusive right” in the sense that the patent
owner may exclude others from certain activities with respect to the
patented invention. The rights are not, however, “exclusive” in the
sense of all encompassing. Some of the more significant restrictions on
the patent owners rights are encompassed in the doctrines of exhaustion
and repair.
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)); see also Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854) (“It is
for the discovery or invention of some practicable means or method of producing a beneficial
result, or effect, that a patent is granted . . . .”).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the invention was known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .
115. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Section 103 was not added to the statute until 1952. However, in 1850 the principle
codified in § 103 was recognized by the Supreme Court as implicit in the patent
statute. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850).
116. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
117. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
118. Id. at 419.
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One of the exclusive rights that a patent confers is the exclusive right
119
The
to sell products incorporating the patented technology.
exhaustion doctrine recognizes that the patent owner obtains the benefit
of the patent monopoly when a patented product is first sold. The
purchaser, having paid the monopoly price in the initial purchase, is
then free to transfer the product without violating what would be
included, on a literal reading of the statute, within the patent owner’s
exclusive right to sell.
The second exclusive right that a patent confers is the exclusive right
120
to manufacture products incorporating the patented technology. The
repair/reconstruction doctrine, as first enunciated in 1945 by Learned
121
Hand, recognizes again that the patent owner obtains the benefit of
the patent monopoly when a patented product is first sold, and the
purchaser is permitted to repair the patented product without violating
what would be included, on a literal reading, within the exclusive right
122
to manufacture.
Even replacement of individual unpatented parts,
one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts
successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his
123
property.
In effect, these two judicial doctrines permit the owner of a patented
product to extend the useful life of the product. The same policy would
lead to the conclusion that a product that needed to be transferred to a
new platform because of technological obsolescence should not
constitute patent infringement—in both cases, the underlying, protected
technology would continue to function but for the failure of an
124
unprotected component.
B. The Federal Copyright Statute: Rights and Exceptions
U.S. copyright law may be traced back to the common law of
England and the English Statute of 1710, which secured to authors the
125
sole right of publication for designated periods. Colonial authors were
protected by common law, which protected the rights of authors until
119. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
120. Id. § 271(c).
121. “The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from . . .
reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they in fact make a new article.” United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945).
122. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
123. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 425.
124. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
125. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 656 (1834).
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publication, and in some states by statute, which remained the sole
127
source of copyright protection under the Articles of Confederation.
The Intellectual Property Clause gave Congress the power to create
federal copyrights, and that power is exercised in Title 17 of the U.S.
128
Code.
Regulations governing the Copyright Office and processing
copyright registration are contained in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
129
Regulations. Federal copyright coexisted with common law copyright
in unpublished works until 1976 when Congress extended federal
statutory copyright to unpublished works and preempted common law
130
rights. The current copyright statute protects works of authorship as
131
soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium, so it is technically not
necessary for the author to put the public in possession of the work in
132
order to create a copyright. The practicalities of proving infringement,
however, make it necessary for the author to surrender any trade secrets
133
by publication of the artistic work in exchange for the exclusive rights
134
of copyright protection.
1. Providing the Required Time-Limited Incentive
A copyright gives its owner the right to stop others from
reproducing, distributing, performing, displaying, or creating derivative
135
works from the protected work for a period that depends on the date
126. The Court in Wheaton, held that common law protection did not extend to works
once they had been published. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591. U.S. copyright statutes likewise preserved
common law copyright rights in unpublished works until 1976 when statutory coverage was
extended to unpublished works and contrary state laws were preempted. 17 U.S.C. § 301
(2006); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
127. See discussion supra note 7.
128. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006).
129. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–501.11 (2009).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 301. Unpublished works already in existence before January 1, 1978,
are treated separately. See 17 U.S.C. § 303.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
132. The author could fix a work (thereby creating a copyright) but not publish it.
Student notes, assuming they are not literal transcriptions of a lecture, would be an example.
133. This disclosure satisfies the requirement of the preamble of the Intellectual
Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
134. This satisfies the requirement of the body of the Intellectual Property Clause. The
copyright owner’s control is exclusive (meaning the right to exclude) but not exhaustive—the
copyright owner can only prevent others from reproducing, distributing, performing,
displaying, or creating derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See discussion infra Part
II.B.2.
135. Subject to 107 through 122, the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
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of creation and the nature of the author. “Anyone who violates any of
136
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer” and is
137
subject to injunctive relief, liability for damages that may include the
138
copyright owner’s damages or, if greater, the infringer’s profits,
139
impoundment of infringing items, and, in appropriate cases, costs and
140
attorneys fees.
2. Furthering Progress
As an exercise of Intellectual Property Clause power, the copyright
141
statute must further progress.
Its core purpose is “promoting broad
142
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts” and like the
patent statute, it accomplishes that purpose in two ways. It does so
directly by the incentive it offers to authors for creation, publication,
143
and registration, and it does so indirectly by what it excludes from
copyright protection, thereby protecting later innovators and the public
by placing limits on the types of works which may be protected and
limits on a copyright owner’s enforcement rights.

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 502.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 504. The copyright statute also provides for statutory damages—fixed
sums that a court may award for infringement without proof of actual damages. 17 U.S.C. §
504(c).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 503.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
141. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1859); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950).
142. Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
143. Copyright attaches to a work upon mere fixation in a tangible medium. There are,
however, benefits to registration, including access to federal courts (the only courts with
jurisdiction to hear copyright infringement cases) and enhanced damages.
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a. Disclosure
Technically, the copyright statute does not require disclosure of a
144
work in order to create a copyright.
A copyright “subsists” in any
145
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium. Originality is
a constitutional requirement, although the threshold of creativity
146
required to meet this requirement is low.
Enforcement, however,
requires access to federal courts, and a jurisdictional requirement is
147
registration. Registration is required in order to enforce a copyright,
but even registration (which requires that a filing becomes publicly
148
available with the Copyright Office) falls far short of “promoting
broad public availability” and does not even require disclosure of the
149
work itself in all cases.
The Copyright Office only reviews the
application for completeness and to determine whether the work is a
“work of authorship.” There is no substantive review to determine if it
150
is similar to, or might infringe, previously registered works. However,
since the only acts constituting infringement are reproducing,

144. Formal requirements for copyrights, such as publication with a notice of copyright
or registration of a claim to copyright, are prohibited by the Berne Convention. Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). Prior to accession to
the Berne Convention, the U.S. copyright statute did require publication with a copyright
notice as a prerequisite to the existence of federal copyright and provided for loss of
copyright if a work were published without the required notice.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
146. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that
the white pages of a telephone directory did not meet the standard of creativity to qualify for
copyright protection).
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. . . .
Original[ity], as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and
that it possesses . . . some minimal degree of creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
Id.
147. “[N]o . . . action for infringement of the copyright . . . shall be instituted until . . .
registration of the copyright claim has been made . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
148. The registration materials are available to the public in the sense that they may be
viewed at the Library of Congress. They are not posted on a web site nor may the public
make copies of the work itself; this would be a violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
149. The Copyright Office has the right to request copies of certain works, but the
registration form does not require that all works be included with registration. See U.S.
Copyright Office Form TX (registration of textual works), Form VA (registration of visual
works) and Form SR (registration of sound recordings).
150. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (“Our copyright
system has no . . . provision for previous examination by a proper tribunal as to . . .
originality . . . .”).
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distributing, performing, displaying, or creating derivatives of the
151
copyrighted work, a work cannot be infringed if it has been disclosed
152
to no one.
b. Reservations: Fair Use and Sections 107–122
Other than the requirements of originality and authorship, there are
153
no restrictions on the types of works that may be copyrighted. There
154
is no mechanism comparable to those provided by the patent statute
to assure that only one copyright is granted with respect to similar
155
works. Thus, it is theoretically possible to face allegations of copyright
infringement from multiple plaintiffs with respect to the same act.
The risk of stifling innovation is reduced in three ways: by the
definition of infringement itself, by specific statutory exceptions to a
copyright owner’s rights, and by judicially created limits on a copyright
owner’s rights.
The definition of infringement requires an act related to the
156
copyright owner’s work—“facts are not copyrightable”
nor is
independent creation of a work, no matter how similar to the
copyrighted work, an act of infringement.
Even as to a copyrightable work, which is the basis of the alleged
infringer’s acts, certain activities are permitted. The rights granted by
157
17 U.S.C. § 106 are all “[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122 . . . .” In
158
brief summary, § 107 codifies the fair use defense, § 108 provides

151. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
152. Copyright infringement does not extend to the underlying ideas in a copyrighted
work, nor does it extend to independently created works, which are similar to a copyrighted
work. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (“[F]acts are not
copyrightable . . . .”). Therefore, it is, as a practical matter, necessary to put the public in
possession of the work in order to establish infringement.
153. Earlier copyright statutes were specific as to types of works that were
copyrightable. The list expanded as new technologies emerged, and the current statute
provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The statute then enumerates a list of categories,
which are included within the definition of “works of authorship,” but the list is not exclusive.
154. See discussion supra Part II.A.
155. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 59 (“Our copyright system has no . . .
provision for previous examination by a proper tribunal as to . . . originality . . . .”).
156. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed in detail infra note 169.
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exceptions for certain library activities, § 109 authorizes resale of a
160
copyrighted work, § 110 authorizes certain educational uses of
161
copyrighted works, §§ 111, 112, 114, 119, and 122 authorize certain
162
uses by broadcasters, § 113 authorizes photographs of physical objects
163
incorporating copyrighted works, § 115 provides for compulsory
164
licenses to “cover” previously released music, § 117 protects certain
165
uses of computer software, § 118 establishes a mechanism for
compulsory licenses at fixed royalties for certain uses of copyrighted
166
167
works, § 120 authorizes photographs of architectural works, and §
121 provides for certain reproductions for use by the blind and other
168
people with disabilities.
The most widely used exception to copyright enforcement is the fair
169
use defense of 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute lays out the factors to be
considered in determining whether a use is fair or not, and several

159. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
162. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable systems), 112 (broadcasters), 114 (radio), 119 (secondary
television transmissions), and 122 (satellite).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2006).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 117, discussed in detail infra note 187.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 118(b)(4).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 121.
169. The doctrine was recognized before it was incorporated in the statute in Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), where Justice Story held it an infringement to copy
319 of the 7,000 pages from Writings of President Washington but noted that “[i]f it had been
the case of a fair and bona fide abridgement of the work of the plaintiffs, it might have
admitted of a very different consideration.” Id. at 349. As discussed infra note 246, the fair
use exception is not as extensive as commonly believed, and is limited to specific types of
uses. The statute provides:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). As argued in discussion infra Part V.A, this is an area that Congress
could amend to deal with the technology-shifting problem.
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principles have been established in judicial decisions:
1. Although the statute directs attention to whether the use is
170
commercial or nonprofit, this factor is not determinative. Commercial
171
uses are presumed unfair but the converse is not true—even a
nonprofit use may constitute infringement.
2. The nature of the work typically distinguishes between fiction and
non-fiction, with works of fiction entitled to more protection than non172
fiction.
173
174
3. Transformative uses are more likely to constitute fair use and
the more transformative a use is, the less significant the other factors are
175
in the analysis.
Even use of an entire unaltered work could
176
theoretically be transformative enough to satisfy fair use.
Use for
criticism and parody receive special consideration, in light of First
177
Amendment concerns.
4. The effect on the potential market for the work has been argued
178
to be the most important element in fair use analysis.
While the fair use defense is available in appropriate cases, the factspecificity of the analysis prompted the Second Circuit to characterize
179
the doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,”
making it dangerous to rely on as a defense.
Section 117 carves out exceptions in the specific area of computer
software and is discussed in detail at note 187, infra.
Finally, while 17 U.S.C. § 106 grants an exclusive right of
distribution, the judicially created “first sale” doctrine provides that,
once a copyright owner has placed a copy in commerce, the lawful
180
owner of that copy may display, resell, or otherwise transfer it.
170. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
171. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
172. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003).
173. A use is transformative if it uses a work in a different manner or for a different
purpose. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990).
174. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 577–78; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.
2007).
177. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 n.28 (11th Cir. 2001).
178. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004); Leval, supra note
173, at 1124.
179. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
180. United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Atherton,
561 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1977). The first sale doctrine is a defense to infringement based on
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C. Trademarks
Trademarks are often treated as a third category of intellectual
181
property rights,
and are included here for completeness, but
trademarks are not enabled by the Intellectual Property Clause and do
not pose the same risk of impeding innovation by increasing early
adopters’ costs as do patents and copyrights.
182
The Trade-Mark Cases held that the Intellectual Property
Clause could not support a federal trademark statute since trademarks
183
were neither inventions nor works of authorship. More fundamentally,
trademarks also differ from copyrights and patents in that trademarks
cannot be created without public disclosure, while the underlying
philosophy of the Intellectual Property Clause is to motivate disclosure
of what may otherwise be maintained as a trade secret. An inventor or
an author has the choice to profit from innovation without making it
public; a trademark owner has no choice but to make the trademark
the exclusive distribution right, not a general defense to infringement. For example,
purchasing an embodiment of a copyrighted work does not confer the right to create an
adaptation of that work. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988). The statute provides:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [which grants the copyright owner
the exclusive right to distribute], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made . . . or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy or phonorecord,
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006), and
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5) [which grants the copyright owner
the exclusive right to display publicly], the owner of a particular copy lawfully made
. . . or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 109(c).
181. Trademarks may be considered intellectual property in the sense that they relate
to an intangible right and relate to a product of the mind. In Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879), the Supreme Court distinguished trademarks from copyrights and patents on the basis
that trademarks were not considered creative. Id. While many modern trademarks exhibit
significant artistic creativity, there is no requirement that a trademark be creative. In fact,
trademarks may be obtained on ordinary words with no design and no particular typeface if
the mark is shown to have acquired secondary meaning—association in the minds of
consumers with a particular source of goods or services.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 93–94. The argument that the statute was a constitutional exercise of
Commerce Clause power also failed. The Court found no expression of congressional intent
to act pursuant to Commerce Clause powers in the legislative history and also held that the
legislation went beyond regulation of federal commerce (under the 1879 interpretation of
interstate commerce). Id. at 97–98. Subsequently, Congress created a trademark registration
system, limited to federal commerce, under the Commerce Clause. Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427–46 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141).

OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10

2010]

5/26/2010 2:19 PM

“TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS

public in order to obtain trademark status
to disclose is required.

184
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and therefore no motivation

III. THE UNBALANCING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ACCELERATION
A goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is technological progress.
If successful, this results in new technologies displacing old technologies
and the obsolescence of the old technology. The acceleration of
technological change, particularly in the converging fields of computer
software, music, video, television, and communications, coupled with
the time required for industry standards to emerge and the power of
technology industry lobbies has left the balance tilted in favor of
rewarding innovators at the expense of further innovation and of
consumers.
Congress recognized the issue in the 1970s in the context of the
emergence of personal computers and created the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), which
it directed to review the emerging technology of personal computer
185
software and recommend changes to the copyright statute. CONTU
reported:
Because of a lack of complete standardization among
programming languages and hardware in the computer industry,
one who rightfully acquires a copy of a program frequently
cannot use it without adapting it to that limited extent which will
allow its use in the possessor’s computer. The copyright law,
which grants to copyright proprietors the exclusive right to
prepare translations, transformations, and adaptations of their
work, should no more prevent such use than it should prevent
rightful possessors from loading programs into their computers.
Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to enable the use
for which it was both sold and purchased should be provided.
The conversion of a program . . . to facilitate use would fall
within this right, as would the right to add features to the
program that were not present at the time of rightful

184. 15 U.S.C. § 1111.
185. CONTU was created by Congress “to assist the President and Congress in
developing a national policy for both protecting the rights of copyright owners and ensuring
public access to copyrighted works when they are used in computer and machine duplication
systems, bearing in mind the public and consumer interest.” NAT’L COMM. ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL, FINAL REPORT 3 (July 31, 1978)
[hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
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acquisition.

186

In response to the report, Congress enacted § 117 of the copyright
187
statute in almost the identical language recommended by CONTU and
thereby, in the specific context of computer software, intended to be
used on a machine which potentially could become obsolete while the
software remained useful, Congress effectively authorized the purchaser
of the software to avoid technological obsolescence by adapting the
188
software to a different machine.
The issue addressed by Congress and CONTU goes beyond
computer software and more generally applies to emerging
technologies, especially when rapid development of a technology is
associated with a lack of standardization. Computer technology was the
first recognized instance of a rapidly developing field, broadly marketed
to consumers, with competing standards that threatened to render early
186. Id. at 13.
187. The Commission’s proposed statutory changes were enacted almost verbatim.
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6461–62. See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[W]e
can consider the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote into law the
majority’s recommendations almost verbatim.”). As enacted, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006)
provides:
Limitation on exclusive rights: computer programs
(a) Making of additional copy or adaptation by owner of copy.—Notwithstanding
the provisions of 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
(b) Lease, sale, or other transfer of additional copy or adaptation.—Any exact
copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased,
sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were
prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program.
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the
copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)–(b) (2006). The one change is from the Commission’s recommended
“rightful possessor” to “owner” in the introductory phrase of 117(a)(2). Cf. CONTU
FINAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 12 with 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2).
188. Adapting a computer program (in copyright terms, creating a derivative work) to
run under a newer operating system does not constitute copyright infringement. Aymes v.
Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1995); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 125–29 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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purchases obsolete and unusable. The problem, however, is the same in
any field meeting those criteria.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER IN PROMOTING PROGRESS (EARLY
ADOPTERS)
The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to promote
progress by granting certain rights to innovators—authors and
inventors. Because of the specific mention of authors and inventors in
the enabling clause, it is not surprising that congressional attention has
focused on their rights to a greater degree than those of competitors and
189
consumers. As discussed above, Congress has enacted specific
exemptions to both the copyright and patent statutes in order to protect
specific activities, but it has been the courts that have recognized
general exemptions.
Overly broad intellectual property rights injure competitors.
190
Fundamental blocking of intellectual property rights may prevent
competitors from entering a field, thereby slowing innovation by forcing
competitors to work around the protected technology (which delays
emergence of industry standards) or wait until the blocking rights in the
technology expire (which, in the case of copyrights, extends beyond the
original author’s lifetime).
This blocking phenomenon has a secondary effect on consumers,
especially on a particularly valuable and vulnerable class of consumers
known as “early adopters,” consumers who purchase early stage
191
technology before an industry standard is established, and in turn has
an effect on innovators as well.
Because intellectual property law provides no direct reward for
innovation but relies instead on profits made in the marketplace as the
192
incentive, advancing progress requires more than the innovative
idea—it also requires the funding necessary to develop the idea into a
commercial product and funding depends on investors’ evaluations of
the likelihood that the product is likely to succeed. Innovation is
189. See discussion supra Part I.
190. A “blocking” right is one that prevents a potential competitor from incorporating
a particular, desirable, feature in a product.
191. Recent examples of early adopters would include buyers of Radio Shack’s Tandy
computer, Sony’s Betamax videorecorder or Toshiba’s HDD high-definition DVD players.
192. “[M]onopolies . . . are granted for certain years to ingenious discoveries in
countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no resources to reward
extraordinary merit.” Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 American
Museum or Repository of Ancient and Modern Fugitive Pieces 303 (1789).
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important, but not sufficient. For example, more than 7.5 million
patents have been issued, and more than 33 million copyrights have
193
been registered. However, only a small percentage even recover the
cost of obtaining the patent or copyright. Estimates of success rates
vary widely, but all estimates are low. In 2005, the Patent Office
estimated the odds of profiting from a patent at 1 in 500: “[O]dds are
stacked astronomically against inventors. . . . There are around 1.5
million patents in effect . . . and of those, maybe 3,000 are commercially
194
viable . . . .”
In 2000, the Patent Office had estimated the odds of
195
The U.S. Small Business
commercial success at 1 in 50.
Administration estimates that only 5% of patents result in products and
196
of those, 50% to 80% fail.
Speculation on the success rate of
inventions is a perennial sport, and some popular press reports put the
197
198
odds of success as high as 5% or as low as 0.02%.
Early adopters contribute significantly to the ultimate success or
failure of new technologies. Early adopters are particularly important
in the field of computers (and computer-based systems) because in
order for an operating system to be commercially successful, there need
to be applications available that will motivate users to purchase the
system; programmers, motivated by the desire for sales, tend to write for
operating systems that have a large user base. Thus, systems which
attract a critical mass of early users build momentum, attracting more
programmers writing more applications, thus making the system
199
attractive to a larger group of purchasers.
The early adopters are

193. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 72; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
supra note 73, at 58. The copyright registration number understates the number of copyrights
created, since registration has not been required, except as a prerequisite to litigation, since
1968. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006).
194. Karen E. Klein, Avoiding the Inventor’s Lament, BUS. WK., Nov. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/nov2005/sb20051109_124661.htm
(quoting Richard Maulsby, director of public affairs for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
195. Susan Glairon, Inventors Find Joy in Journey from Idea to Product, TRIB.
BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 17, 2000.
196. Barbara Bradley, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 18, 1990, p. 1 PC.
197. Tim Lemke, Invention + Market Savvy = Successful Product, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2001, at D8; Caryne Brown, Making Money Making Toys, BLACK ENTER., Nov. 1993, at
68.
198. “[E]xperts estimate that 1 out of 5,000 inventions have gone on to successful
product launches.” Bevolyn Williams-Harold, You’ve Got It Made!, BLACK ENTER., June
1999, at 259–60.
199. The same pattern applies to the entertainment field as well. By contemporary
accounts, the Sony Betamax was technically superior to VHS, but more prerecorded videos
were made available on VHS than on Beta, making the VHS machines of greater value to
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vulnerable because they must invest not only in the early stage
technology but also in the time and effort required to make use of, and
build systems around, the technology before it has been fully tested by
large groups of users. They also risk losing their investment if a
different technology prevails as the industry standard, rendering their
choice obsolete. Examples would include libraries of Beta format
videotapes or HDD format DVDs, neither of which can be played on
current production machines.
Even assuming that Congress were to conclude that the sole
measure of meeting the constitutional objective of furthering progress
was the extent to which intellectual property laws rewarded innovators,
in order for the innovators to obtain the indirect incentive of limitedterm monopoly profits, market acceptance is necessary. Early adopters
are an important factor in whether a product succeeds in the
marketplace and therefore early adopters play a critical role in
200
promoting progress. Innovators benefit when consumers adopt
innovative (and unproven) technology. Early adopters, in turn, can
more safely purchase and invest the time and resources necessary to
implement early stage technology if they can be assured that their
investment will be protected by being transferrable to a competing
technology that prevails as the industry standard. In addition, since the
general pattern of technology pricing is for prices to drop over time,
early adopters overpay with respect to late followers. Therefore, a
rational early adopter would weigh the increased price against the value
of early access to the technology. To the extent the risk of early
adoption is reduced, early adopters should be more willing to invest in
early stage technology, thereby furthering the goal of promoting
progress.
It would be reasonable to ask why, if the interests of consumers in
general and early adopters in particular are so important to the
consumers since they provided a greater selection of movies. Ultimately, VHS was the more
successful format and became the industry standard, forcing Sony to abandon its Betamax
machine and begin producing VHS machines. More recently, Sony’s BluRay and Toshiba’s
HDD high definition DVDs created a competition between these two standard-bearers to
enlist content producers to license their works. When Toshiba lost that competition, it
abandoned its HDD format.
200. The mere fact that infringement provides an incidental benefit to the copyright
holder is generally not a defense to infringement. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980). Here, however, the argument is not that
early adopters should have a defense to an infringement action under the current statute, but
rather that the statute should recognize their role in promoting progress and provide a
statutory defense.
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objective of progress, the Constitution failed to include any explicit
provision recognizing their interests. There are several possible
201
answers, although as noted above, all are speculation. It is arguable
that the preamble to the Intellectual Property Clause is in effect a public
domain provision designed to protect consumers by requiring that in
granting rights to authors and inventors Congress take the goal of
promoting progress into account. It is also possible that the Framers
expected that the “limited times” provision of the Intellectual Property
Clause was a sufficient protection and it assumed that future Congresses
would stay close to the terms of protection that were then in effect in
the colonies and England—approximately fourteen years—especially
given the comparatively slow pace of technological innovation at the
time. The first Congress’s adoption of comparable time periods for
protection may be considered persuasive evidence of constitutional
202
intent. Finally, it should be remembered that words were considerably
more expensive in the eighteenth century than they are today, both in
terms of the cost to produce and the cost to copy. Thus, the better
question might be not why no Public Domain Clause was included, but
203
rather why an Intellectual Property Clause was included, particularly
when the philosophy of the Constitution was “[t]o insert essential
principles only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to
204
be accommodated to times and events.” One explanation may be that
the purpose was to assure that exclusive rights were only granted to
promote progress rather than as the political rewards that had been
205
common in England.
Another explanation that has been offered is
that the purpose of including the clause was “not so much as an express
authority to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, but
rather as a means of ensuring authority to do so in a particular way,
206
namely, by securing exclusive rights for limited times . . . .”

201. See discussion supra Part IV.
202. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (“The actions of the First
Congress . . . are of course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means . . . .”).
203. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26.
204. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 22, at 137
(quoting Edmund Randolph). See also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)
(when interpreting the Constitution, it is presumed “that no word was unnecessarily used, or
needlessly added”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”).
205. See discussion supra Part I.
206. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 33.
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Regardless of the explanation, it is clear that the clause was written
207
against an anti-monopoly background and that its objective was to
promote progress with rewards to innovators a secondary consequence
208
rather than the objective.
V. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL BALANCE POINTS
A. Congress’s Balance
Congress’s only tool under the Intellectual Property Clause is the
grant of exclusive rights; “[i]t is Congress that has been assigned the task
of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
209
authors . . . .” The “exclusive” rights, which Congress has the power to
grant, are exclusive in the sense of “right to exclude” rather than “allinclusive rights.” Thus, there is room to reward innovators with
exclusive rights while still reserving to the public sufficient rights to
guard against stifling further innovation. In recent attempts to strike the
balance, Congress has tended to focus on the motivation to innovate
side of the balance and paid less attention to the impediment to
innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded
lobbyists.
This bias is understandable, even ignoring the influence of lobbying.
It is hard to find an example of the technological obsolescence problem
210
even as late as the last major copyright revision (1968).
When
Congress revamped the copyright statute in 1968, it did perceive the
broad outlines of the problem with respect to the then-emerging
personal computer industry, and responded with a “placeholder”
211
provision in the statute.
Prior to that, other technology
transformations did not lend themselves to shifting to the new
technology while preserving values that had been built under the old
technology. For example, when automobiles replaced horse drawn

207. See discussion supra Part I.
208. “The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are . . . [not] primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. . . . [They are ] intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors . . .” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984).
209. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 429). It is
also preferable that Congress, rather than the Courts, set the balance. Statutes can provide
greater uniformity, clarity, and completeness than judicial decisions.
210. The last major patent statute revision was even earlier (1952).
211. See discussion supra note 187. The “placeholder” provision (17 U.S.C. § 117)
remains in place more than forty years later.
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carriages, not much of the carriage industry was prevented from
transitioning to the automobile industry by patents or copyrights. With
the introduction of the phonograph, John Philip Sousa feared that the
212
new technology would destroy the demand for live music, but those
who had previously enjoyed live music had (by definition) no library of
music that was trapped in the old technology by intellectual property
rights. More recently, in the movie studios’ views, Sony’s introduction
213
of the Betamax videorecorder threatened the film industry but again
Betamax owners had no pre-existing libraries to transfer.
Congress has provided situation-specific exceptions to the general
214
rights of copyright holders.
For example, while 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)
secures the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords,” 17
U.S.C. § 109 permits the lawful owner of an embodiment of a
copyrighted work to transfer that copy.
Specific institutions—
215
216
217
218
libraries, schools, broadcasters, and the music industry —are at
least partially insulated from copyright infringement liability. More
broadly, although not as broadly as popularly believed, Congress
219
codified a fair use defense.
Weighing against these specific exemptions, however, is the dramatic
220
expansion of the term of copyright. Under the Berne Convention, the
United States was required to provide copyright protection for a
221
minimum term of the life of the author plus fifty years.
Congress

212. “John Philip Sousa predicted that recordings would lead to the demise of music.
The phonograph, he warned . . . [would] put professional musicians out of work.” Alex Ross,
The Record Effect: How Technology Has Transformed the Sound of Music, THE NEW
YORKER, June 6, 2005, at 94.
213. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687). Ironically (and arguably confirming the validity of the
Founders’ faith in the free market system to “promote progress”), Sony now is a major
motion picture producer; and videotapes and DVDs account for more of its revenues than do
theatrical releases.
214. The general rights are provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
215. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
216. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
217. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable systems), 112 (broadcasters), 114 (radio), 119 (secondary
television transmissions), and 122 (satellite).
218. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 118.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed in detail supra note 169.
220. Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) entered into
force in the United States on March 1, 1989. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
221. Retroactivity is not required by the Berne Convention and not all countries made
the extension retroactive.
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passed implementing legislation and justified the extensions as follows:
The purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate copyright
protection for American works in foreign nations and the
continued economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of
trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works. The bill
accomplishes these goals by extending the current U.S. copyright
term for an additional 20 years. Such an extension will provide
significant trade benefits by . . . ensuring fair compensation for
American creators who deserve to benefit fully from the
exploitation of their works. Moreover, by stimulating the
creation of new works and providing enhanced economic
incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension will
enhance the long-term volume, vitality, and accessibility of the
222
public domain.
Supporters argued that the extension was necessary because life
expectancy had risen dramatically since 1790 when the first copyright
act (setting a fourteen-year term and one fourteen-year renewal term)
223
was passed.
However, nothing in the Constitution or the adoption
debates provides any support for the notion that copyright terms should
be based on the author’s lifespan, and patents, which arise under the
same clause, have had approximately the same fixed term throughout
the history of the Constitution. Some supporters felt the term extension
did not go far enough in rewarding authors. Congresswoman Mary
Bono wanted a perpetual term but was “informed by staff that such a
change would violate the Constitution” and suggested considering Jack
224
225
Valenti’s proposal for a term of “forever less one day.” The courts
have uniformly held, however, that “[t]he monopoly privileges that
Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. . . . [They are] intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
226
exclusive control has expired.” Supporters therefore also argued that
a dramatic extension of copyright term would result in more works

222. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996).
223. 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch on the
passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
224. Jack Valenti was president of the Motion Picture Association of America.
225. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998).
226. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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being made available to the public. Interestingly, though, Disney’s
response to the extended term of protection was to adopt precisely the
opposite strategy, taking existing works off the market, offering them
227
for limited times then placing them “tucked [away] in the vault.”
228
The 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended
the term of existing and future copyrights by approximately twenty
years. Given the current rate of technological advance, it is unlikely
that any current method for distributing data other than paper will still
be available when today’s copyrights expire. The act was challenged as
violating the constitutional limits of Congress’s authority in the
.229
intellectual property field, but upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
As
Justice Stevens pointed out, in the eighty years preceding the Eldred
decision, only one year’s worth of copyrighted material had fallen into
230
the public domain.
In addition to extending the term of copyright, Congress took
additional steps to protect content providers. The Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”) was enacted to deal with the
perceived threat of digital audio recording technology, which permitted
repeated reproduction of music files without significant loss of sound
quality. The AHRA requires that devices capable of making digital
231
copies of music incorporate copy controls, and imposes royalties on
manufacturers, distributors, and importers of such devices and the
232
media used for digital copying.
In exchange, the Act exempts
noncommercial consumer copying of music from copyright
233
infringement.
Note that the activities protected by AHRA are
227. Thomas K. Arnold, ‘Bambi’ is Back—for 70 ‘II’ Days, USAToday.com (Feb. 6,
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2006-02-06-bambi_x.htm (noting that at the
time thirty films were scheduled for re-release moratorium and that the strategy allowed
maintaining prices—“[i]f you keep it on the shelves, the only option you have is to keep
repricing it, lower and lower.”); Robert La Franco, Eisner’s Bumpy Ride, FORBES, July 5,
1999, at 50; Vaulting the Disney Gap and Its Plan for Profits, DailyTrojan.com, Jan. 25, 2005,
http://dailytrojan.com/?s=Vaulting+the+Disney+Gap+and+its+Plan+for+Profits
(“Walt
Disney Company seeks to drive up the demand for their supposed ‘limited’ amount of discs”;
noting that MGM followed a similar strategy with its James Bond films).
228. Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (upheld by Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003)).
229. 537 U.S. 186. The case was initially filed against Attorney General Janet Reno,
but her successor John Ashcroft was substituted.
230. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
232. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003–1005.
233. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 provides:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based

OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10

2010]

5/26/2010 2:19 PM

“TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS

309

broader than the right of technology-shifting; the AHRA protects what
would otherwise be an infringement of copyright by someone who has
not even acquired ownership of the work in an earlier technological
form.
Finally, under the authority of the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) treaty, Congress passed an antibootlegging criminal statute prohibiting recording or distribution of live
musical performances for commercial advantage or private financial
234
gain.
B. The Courts’ Balance
1. Deference to Congressional Balancing
The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the powers of
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms
of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there
235
can be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure”
and that, so long as the term of exclusive rights is only for a limited
period, it may even extend the duration of existing copyrights and
236
patents.
Courts have been extremely deferential to the term of
protection that Congress chooses when striking the appropriate
237
balance.

on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device,
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical
recordings.
The main purpose of this section was “to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or
digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.”
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. 102-294 at 86 (1992)).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006). To date, court decisions on the application of the act
have split. See discussion infra Part V.B.
235. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
236. Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 539, 552–54 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 349–52 (1864);
Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 414, 417 (1873). The CTEA included retroactive
provisions, extending the term of copyrights in works that had already been created, which
were upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
237. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (holding the CTEA twenty-year
extension of copyright for works already in existence constitutional despite Justice Breyer’s
demonstration that the term was nearly unlimited from a discounted cash value perspective).
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2. Judicial Independent Judgment
Although the courts have deferred to Congress’s judgment on the
question of appropriate terms of protection, the Intellectual Property
Clause “is both a grant of power and a limitation . . . [and] Congress . . .
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
238
purpose.”
Congress’s power, even if plenary, is still limited by the
Constitution, as recognized in both Graham v. John Deere Co. and
239
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
Copyright and patent laws are distinct implementations of the
Intellectual Property Clause, but their common ancestry explains broad
240
similarities between the two areas of law. Both grant monopoly rights,
in each case as an unavoidable consequence of the primary goal of
providing benefits to the public rather than primarily for the benefit of
authors or inventors. In each area, early judicial decisions established
241
areas which were exempt from the monopoly.
The Supreme Court
242
sees each as a source of guidance in the other.

238. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
239. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), the Court
held that the preamble limited congressional power and that Congress could not remove
technology from the public domain because doing so would thwart the constitutional
mandate to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Further, as this Court has
held, in light of the limitations built into “[t]he Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between
the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Id. at 146. In
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6, the Court held that:
[I]t must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific
constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of
. . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation. . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already available.
240. Both involve the grant of a limited monopoly: a patent owner has a set of
exclusive rights, set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006), similar to those of a copyright owner, set
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106. Both distinguish between the rights of the owner of the intellectual
property right and the rights of the purchaser of a product embodying the intellectual
property right. Both have developed doctrines whereby the purchaser of a product
embodying the intellectual property right obtains ownership of the product plus a license to
use the embodied intellectual property with respect to that product.
241. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850).
242. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
We recognize there are substantial differences between the patent and copyright
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While deferring to Congress’s judgment in areas such as the term of
protection, the courts have intervened in several important areas to
protect the constitutional requirement that the protection furthers
progress. The current patent statute prohibits granting patents for
obvious advances:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of
this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
243
subject matter pertains.
This section was not added to the statute until 1952. The principle it
244
codified, however, was announced by the Supreme Court in 1850 as
necessary to promote progress by keeping inventions that technically
met the statutory requirement of novelty but were trivial modifications
of existing technology from becoming patented and therefore impeding
development of the field. The courts have also read restrictions into the
list of categories eligible for patent protection in order to preserve
fundamental discoveries of laws of nature as an area open to all
245
innovators.
In the copyright area, the Court has recognized that fair use is an

laws. But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the
recognition that adequate protection . . . may require the courts to look beyond
actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make
such duplication possible.
Id.; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (2006).
243. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
244. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 261.
245. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981). Although the Federal Circuit opined that:
The Supreme Court has not been clear . . . as to whether such subject matter is
excluded from the scope of § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas. . . . The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to
exactly what kind of mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The
Supreme Court has used, among others, the terms “mathematical algorithm,”
“mathematical formula,” and “mathematical equation” to describe types of
mathematical subject matter not entitled to patent protection standing alone. The
Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of
what it intended by such terms or how these terms are related, if at all.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10

5/26/2010 2:19 PM

312 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2

exception from copyright rights, and that “time-shifting,” although
resulting in what would otherwise be the making of an infringing copy,
is likewise protected as required by the constitutional duty to promote
246
progress.
The lower courts have recognized a similar exception for what has
247
been referred to as “place-shifting” or “space-shifting.”
In In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation, the court noted a hypothetical list of
activities, which would not be considered infringement, although they
fall within the literal definition of the copyright statute. Of particular
interest, the court suggested:
Someone might own a popular-music CD that he was particularly
fond of, but he had not downloaded it into his computer and now
he finds himself out of town but with his laptop and he wants to
listen to the CD, so he uses Aimster’s service to download a
copy. This might be a fair use rather than a copyright
infringement, by analogy to the time-shifting approved as fair use
248
in the Sony case.
In United States v. Martignon, a New York district court refused to
249
enforce the anti-bootlegging statute and dismissed an indictment,
holding the statute unconstitutional as violating two restrictions in the
Intellectual Property Clause: granting protection for a work that had not
been “fixed” (and was therefore not a “writing”) and avoiding the
246. In Sony, it was shown that Sony knew its videotape recorder would, in addition to
being used for playing home movies (which were not alleged to infringe plaintiffs’
copyrights), also be used for “time-shifting” (recording a television program for playback at a
later time). Sony, 464 U.S. at 423. The Court held this time-shifting to be fair use, and
therefore not an infringement of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Id. at 442. See also
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (fair use exception);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (to invoke fair use
exception).
247. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 1999); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court
characterizes the transfer in this hypothetical case as “fair use” by analogy to the time-shifting
use in Sony. An alternative route to the same result would be that it is a use within the
implied license granted to the purchaser of the CD. Yet, a third path would be to hold the
hypothetical transfer protected by the AHRA, although that would place the decision in
conflict with Recording Industries Ass’n.
248. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(A) (2006), enacted pursuant to the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) treaty. The statute proscribed the unauthorized
recording or distribution of a live musical performance for commercial advantage or private
financial gain.

OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10

2010]

5/26/2010 2:19 PM

“TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS

313

250

limited times requirement.
“Congress may not side-step the
Copyright Clause’s limitations through legislating under the Commerce
251
Clause.”
In United States v. Moghadam, a defendant was convicted
252
under the same statute although the Eleventh Circuit held the statute
253
could not be supported by the Intellectual Property Clause and relied
instead on the Commerce Clause as a source of authority.
VI. RESTORING THE BALANCE
The courts have taken steps toward restoring the balance through
recognition of time-shifting and place-shifting exceptions to copyright
owners’ rights and repair exceptions to patent owners’ rights. These
are, however, merely pieces of the solution. Furthermore, even though
courts are recognizing user rights in these areas, there are transaction
costs associated with vindicating specific rights through litigation. Of
particular concern, different rules have been applied to copyrights and
patents. While this posed little practical problem in the nineteenth
century, the recent convergence of technology in the fields of computer
software, communications, and media has blurred the lines between
254
what is protected by patent and what is protected by copyright, and a
single standard would provide needed clarity. As argued above,
reducing uncertainty reduces the cost to early adopters and therefore
promotes progress. What is now required to restore the balance is a
generalized technology-shifting exception to the rights of intellectual
property owners. That exception would include at least four substantive

250. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
251. Id. at 426.
252. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
253. The court found the statute constitutional as within Congress’s authority under
the Commerce Clause because it was “not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation
requirement of the Copyright Clause.” Id. at 1281. The Eleventh Circuit assumed “arguendo,
without deciding, that the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the
Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause . . . were fundamentally
inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause,” id. at 1280 n.12, but
concluded that “extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical performances is
in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, even if that Clause itself does not directly
authorize such protection.” Id. at 1280.
254. Software companies once thought software unpatentable. The Patent Office
agreed and initially took the position that software was not patentable. Examination of
Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609-10 (Oct. 22, 1968).
Software patents now generate annual patent licensing revenue in the billions. In 2006, IBM
alone earned more than $ 1 billion in royalty revenue, largely from software patents. IBM,
2006 Annual Report, 80, available at ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/annualreport/2006/2006 ibm
annual.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
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rights, all flowing from the general right of continued access to data (in
its broadest sense) which has been lawfully acquired or created:
1. The right to “move to the winning standard.”
This right would not guarantee a cost-free upgrade to a new
technology but would simply guarantee that no legal impediments be
placed in the way of the transfer. Such a right would reduce the risk of
adopting a technological advance while there is still competition to
become the industry standard and would make it easier for users to
move to new technologies earlier in their development cycle. Since
technologies must become commercially successful in order to provide a
return to the innovators, and since money has a time value, facilitating
early adoption of technologies helps promote progress. An example
would be the right to copy a Beta videotape to a VHS videotape.
2. The right to remain up to date.
Broader than the right to move from a losing contender for industry
standard to the winner, this right would likewise not guarantee a costfree upgrade to a newer version of technology but would simply
guarantee that no legal impediments be placed in the way of the
upgrade. Such a right would assure that a producer of technology could
not force users to choose between upgrading to other technology or
losing meaningful access to data.
3. The right to choice of embodiment.
Broader still than the right to remain up to date, this right would
again not guarantee a cost-free conversion from one medium to another
but would simply guarantee the absence of legal impediments. In the
music context, it would guarantee that a purchaser of music in any
format could not be prevented from embodying that music in a different
format or medium in order to play it on whatever device was most
convenient for the user. An example would be the right to transfer a
tune from an 8-track tape to CD. Arguably, in the context of digital
music this right is already provided by § 117 of the Copyright Act.
4. The right to terminate Digital Rights Management.
Faced with the problem that digital copies had become cheap and
simple to make and resulted in little or no degradation from the
original, Congress enacted legislation requiring equipment
manufacturers to provide mechanisms to prevent copying and made it
illegal to provide technology that subverted those mechanisms.
Consistent with the Intellectual Property Clause requirement that
exclusive rights be granted for limited times, any digital rights
management restraints that have been incorporated in a work should be
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rendered inoperative no later than the date on which the last of the
intellectual property rights protected by the DRM expires. In the
patent context, keeping an invention from the public outside of the term
of the patent constitutes suppression, resulting in loss of patent rights, if
prior to filing a patent application, and a possible violation of antitrust
laws if after the expiration of the patent. The goal of tying DRM to the
copyright term could be accomplished by incorporating a time limit in
the DRM device itself, or by placing codes for disabling the device in
escrow and granting users access to the escrow at the appropriate time.
A. The Preferred Solution: A Statutory Right to “Technology-Shifting”
“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the
255
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors,” and
there are several reasons why it would be preferable that Congress do
so. A statute could provide a clear, comprehensive, uniform, and
certain set of rights much more quickly than a series of cases could, even
in the unlikely event that all of the cases were consistent and the
collection of cases were comprehensive in coverage.
Congress has the power to impose the proposed restrictions, has
exercised similar power in the past, and is limited only by the
constitutional requirement that it grant “exclusive” rights. Congress has
the power to decide which inventions and works of authorship to
256
protect and for how long.
The exclusive right that Congress is
authorized to secure to authors and inventors owes its existence solely
257
to the acts of Congress securing it, from which it follows that the rights
granted by a patent or copyright are subject to such qualifications and
258
limitations as Congress sees fit to impose.
Examples of prior limitations, which Congress has placed on a
patent or copyright owner’s exclusive rights include the following:
In the copyright area, Congress has repeatedly provided exceptions
to copyright owners’ rights without running afoul of the requirement to
grant “exclusive” rights. It has provided a fair use exception to all types
255. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
256. “Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection
organisms produced by genetic engineering.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318
(1980) (holding living organisms patentable under the current statute); see also Eldred, 537
U.S. at 186 (Congress is free to set the term of copyrights.).
257. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 660 (1834); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82,
86 (1899).
258. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 662; Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815).
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of copyrights.
It has also provided exceptions applicable to certain
260
types of copyrights, for example those relating to computer programs,
261
and those covering sound recordings, and has created exceptions to a
262
copyright owner’s exclusive rights (for example, fair use, library and
263
264
archive copying, ephemeral recordings, and compulsory licenses for
265
phonorecords and cable).
Congress has also chosen to exempt certain activities from copyright
infringement but imposed a tax to generate a fund to be distributed to
the copyright owners to deal with digital copying of audio
266
performances.
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal system is another

259. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), discussed supra note 169.
260. 17 U.S.C. 117, discussed supra note 187.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) provides the exclusive right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending.” However, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (to which 106 is subject) permits the lawful owner of an
embodiment of a copyrighted work to transfer that copy.
262. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed supra note 169, provides that: “the fair use of a
copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright.”
263. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) provides that:
[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives . . . to reproduce no
more than one copy or phonorecord of a work . . . or to distribute such copy or
phonorecord, under the conditions specified by this section if—(1) the reproduction
or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial
advantage; (2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or
(ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with
the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a
specialized field; and (3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a
notice of copyright . . . .
264. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (compelling license for cable systems); 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)
(compelling license for distributed phonorecords).
266. “A ‘digital audio copied recording’ is a reproduction in a digital recording
format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from
another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.” 17 U.S.C. §
1001(1).
A “digital audio recording device” is any machine or device of a type commonly
distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as
part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a
digital audio copied recording for private use . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device,
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a
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example of the royalty/tax coupled with mandatory licensing regime.
In the patent area, Congress may exercise the legislative right to
268
exclude certain classes of inventions from patent protection and has
269
and with respect to specific types of
done so both generally
technology. For example, Congress has limited patents to four
270
categories of statutory subject matter. Congress has permitted patents
to be granted for medical procedures but has limited enforcement of
those patents to the point where there is no practical value to such
patents. Congress has made patents on business methods subject to
special defenses not applicable to other types of patents. In addition,
certain inventions related to atomic weapons are completely excluded
271
from patentability even though they are statutory subject matter.
B. Judicial Intervention
For the reasons discussed above, legislative action is the preferred
way to restore the balance. There are, however, advantages to judicial
action in areas of rapid technological advances in general. In order to
pass a statute, it is necessary that the problem be recognized, that its
consequences be predicted, and that political agreement on the nature
of the problem and the appropriate solution be reached—generally a
time-consuming process. Therefore, until Congress takes such action,
there is support for judicial recognition that current statutory rights are
subject to a constitutionally required right of technology-shifting.
It is arguable that the copyright first sale doctrine, permitting the
owner of a copyrighted work to “transfer” it, is by its terms broad
enough to permit “transfer” not to a new owner but to a new format.

device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical
recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 1008. In effect, taxes are paid on the medium used for copying, the revenue is
distributed to copyright holders, and end-users are immune from liability for copyright
infringement.
267. This system is equivalent to a tax coupled with exemption from infringement
liability.
268. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (excluding certain nuclear energy technology from
patent protection); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (“Congress is
free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic
engineering.”).
269. Examples of general exceptions include the requirement that to be patentable an
invention must fall within one of four enumerated categories. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
270. Id.
271. The exclusion is contained, not in the patent statute, but in the Atomic Energy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2006).
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To the extent the technology in question is a computer program
272
within the meaning of the copyright statute, the owner of a lawful copy
(for example, music embodied in a CD) already has the right, under 17
U.S.C. § 117, to make copies and adaptations required for utilization in
conjunction with a machine, or by extension, necessary for the
273
“effective” use of the embodiment to enjoy the music. The statutory
definition of a “computer program” as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
274
bring about a certain result” does not resolve a grey area between
instructions and “data”—as programmers know, “one man’s data is
275
Courts could therefore intervene on
another man’s command.”
narrow grounds of statutory interpretation.
To the extent the technology in question is a consumer product,
there is another avenue of narrow intervention based on consumer
expectations as to the rights acquired upon purchase of a product
incorporating protected technology (for example a CD or DVD). The
distinction between the product and the incorporated intellectual
276
property is recognized in both copyright and patent law. For example,
purchasers of CDs or DVDs do not acquire the copyright in the music
or movie, but they certainly acquire something more than mere
ownership of the plastic. At a minimum, they also acquire a license to
277
play the music or watch the movie. The general presumption is that a

272. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a “computer program” as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result.” 17 U.S.C. § 117 then provides the substantive user rights (or, alternatively,
restrictions on the rights granted the copyright owners) associated with computer software.
273. See 6 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
8.08[B][1][b] (Dec. 2009) (“‘[t]he trend is to read Section 117 broadly’” (quoting DSC
Communs. Corp. v. Pulse Communs., 976 F. Supp. 359, 362 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev’d in part, 170
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999) and “loading onto the hard drive
should be viewed as ‘essential’ to the optimal utilization of the subject computer program
marketed on floppies or on discs”)).
274. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
275. This aphorism appears to have originated in a 1973 presentation by C. J.
Stephenson of Stanford University. C. J. Stephenson, On the Structure and Control of
Commands (One Man’s Data Are Another Man’s Command), PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTH SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEM PRINCIPLES (Thomas J. Watson Research
Center, N.Y.).
276. “Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.” 17 U.S.C. §
202 (2006).
277. The CONTU Final Report states that “[o]bviously, creators, lessors, licensors, and
vendors of copies of [computer] programs intend that they be used by their customers, so that
rightful users would but rarely need a legal shield against potential copyright problems. It is
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license is perpetual unless the parties indicate otherwise.
It would
seem inconsistent with the concept of ownership if a purchaser lost the
right to enjoy the purchase simply because the machinery necessary to
play it became obsolete and no longer available. Congress certainly did
not think so, at least in terms of copyright protection. The CONTU
279
Final Report states, “Obviously, . . . vendors [of computer programs]
intend that they be used by their customers, so that rightful users would
280
but rarely need a legal shield against potential copyright problems.”
Early advertisements for phonographs and records emphasized the
281
value of owning a record: the music would be “yours for keeps,” and
John Philip Sousa contemplated a cupboard full of such recordings
282
supplanting the demand for live performances.
Patent law’s
authorization of repair of patented products so as to extend their utility
similarly supports the concept that the license is perpetual and medium283
independent.
On the other hand, medium-limited licenses open the
easy to imagine, however, a situation in which the copyright owner might desire, for good
reason or none at all, to force a lawful owner or possessor of a copy to stop using a particular
program. One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program, therefore, should be provided
with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its use by that possessor.”
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 13.
278. “[A patent] license without expressed limit as to time is a license for the unexpired
life of the patent.” Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (citing St. Paul
Plow-Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184 (1891)); “[w]here an assignment or license [of a
copyright] does not expressly prescribe the period or term of its duration, it will generally be
construed (in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent) to be effective for the duration of
the then existing copyright term of the work.” TV Globo Ltda. v. Brazil Up-Date Weekly,
Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1478, 1479 (1999) (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(F), at
10–98). Technically, the cases hold that the license is for the term of the copyright (or
patent), but this is in effect a perpetual license since once the copyright or patent expires
there is no longer a need for the license.
279. There does not appear to be a reason to distinguish computer programs from
modern music or video products.
280. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 13.
281. See, e.g., RCA Victrola ad, National Geographic Magazine (National Geographic
Society) Vol. LXXV No. Two, Feb. 1939 at 275: “The World’s Greatest Artists are Yours for
Keeps on Victor Records. They’ll thrill you with the music you love whenever you desire.”
282. Alex Ross, The Record Effect: How Technology has Transformed the Sound of
Music, THE NEW YORKER, June 6, 2005, at 94.
Ninety-nine years ago, John Philip Sousa predicted that recordings would lead to the
demise of music. The phonograph, he warned . . . [would] put professional
musicians out of work. “The time is coming when no one will be ready to submit
himself to the ennobling discipline of learning music,” he wrote. “Everyone will
have their ready made or ready pirated music in their cupboards.”
Id.
283. For a detailed discussion of the rights of an owner to repair a patented product,
see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Yours for Keeps: MGM v. Grokster, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
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possibility for a potentially troublesome business model built around
periodically planned obsolescence of certain formats in order to create
284
new demand, and the incentive to do so is great.
While these approaches are attractive ways of protecting certain
innovators and consumers, they only apply in limited situations and they
rely on interpretation of the current statutes and therefore could be
defeated by Congress. A broad, constitutionally based solution is
preferable. The courts have intervened on this basis in the past. The
Supreme Court solved the problem of patents being issued on trivial
285
technological advances in 1850, long before Congress enacted a statute
286
to deal with the issue in 1952.
The Supreme Court recognized the
right of fair use long before Congress codified it in 17 U.S.C. § 107, and
the Court applied the right in order to protect non-commercial time287
shifting. These prior judicial decisions were made in the light of the
technology of the time. Now that a fuller picture of the comprehensive
impact of technological development and related obsolescence has
emerged, it is time for an equally comprehensive right of technologyshifting.

COMPUTER & INFO. L. 209 (2005).
284. The cost of the new sales would be low; the work has already been created and all
that needs to be done is convert the format. The model is similar to Disney’s “vault” model.
See, e.g., Thomas K. Arnold, ‘Bambi’ is Back—for 70 ‘II’ Days, USAToday.com (Feb. 6,
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2006-02-06-bambi_x.htm (noting that at the
time thirty films were scheduled for re-release moratorium and that the strategy allowed
maintaining prices—“if you keep it on the shelves, the only option you have is to keep
repricing it, lower and lower.”); Robert La Franco, Eisner’s Bumpy Ride, FORBES, July 5,
1999, at 50.
285. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
286. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
287. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[E]ven the
unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents’ programs is legitimate fair use.”).

